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Porchia v. City of Las Vegas, 138 Nev. Adv. Op. 4 (Feb. 17, 2022)1
APPLYING THE PUBLIC DUTY DOCTRINE AND THE GOOD SAMARITAN STATUTE
TO PUBLIC OFFICERS WHO ACT BASED ON SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS

Summary
In an opinion drafted by Justice Herndon, the Court considered whether the district court
erred in dismissing the appellant Larry Porchia’s complaint in its entirety. Porchia alleged that he
was denied medical treatment and transportation by the EMTs after they negligently
misdiagnosed him because he was experiencing homelessness and was uninsured. The district
court dismissed his complaint with the rationale that the claims were barred by the public duty
doctrine and the Good Samaritan statute. However, the Court reasoned that accepting Porchia’s
allegations as true, the EMT’s failure to provide medical assistance or transportation to the
hospital based on the appellant’s socioeconomic status may be gross negligence and an
affirmative act exempted from the public duty doctrine. Thus, the Good Samaritan statute would
be inapplicable. The Court held that the district court erred in dismissing the complaint in its
entirety.
Facts and Procedural History
This opinion comes from an appeal from an Eighth Judicial District Court order granting
a motion to dismiss a tort action. On August 26, 2015, at 3:45am, Porchia was suffering from
severe stomach pain, vomiting, and hot flashes. His friend called for emergency help. Las Vegas
Fire and Rescue dispatched EMTs Stephen Massa and Nicholas Pavelka. Massa and Pavelka put
Porchia on a stretcher, took his vitals, and asked him questions about how he was feeling.
Porchia requested to be taken to the hospital. Porchia’s complaint stated that once he told Massa
and Pavelka that he was experiencing homelessness and did not have insurance, they diagnosed
him with gas pain and took him off the stretcher. Massa and Pavelka concluded that Porchia did
not need to go to the hospital.
At 11 a.m. the same day, another one of Porchia’s friends called emergency services
because he had continuing severe pain. When Las Vegas Fire and Rescue were dispatched this
time, with different EMTs, they immediately transported Porchia to the hospital. Porchia had
emergency surgery for a bowl obstruction. Porchia stated that the doctor and nurse let me know
that if he had received treatment earlier, he would not have needed emergency surgery.
Porchia brought a claim pro se against the respondents. The district court granted the
respondents motion to dismiss on the basis that they couldn’t be held liable because of the public
duty doctrine, NRS 41.0336, and the Good Samaritan statute, NRS 41.500(5). The Court of
Appeals affirmed the district court’s order and the Supreme Court granted Porchia’s petition for
review.
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Discussion
The public duty doctrine
The Court first clarified that they would review the district court’s decision to dismiss a
complaint under a de novo standard of review. 2 Then, they addressed whether the public duty
doctrine applied. After reviewing past case law on the public duty doctrine, the Court explained
that the doctrine shields public entities such as fire departments and ambulances services, from
liability on the basis that they should not be inhibited by their good faith efforts to serve the
community.3 The doctrine applies even when the outcome of their care is less than desirable. The
public duty doctrine was codified in the Nevada Revised Statutes and states that public officers
assisting in an emergency are not liable for the negligent acts or omissions unless: (1) the officer
made a promise or representation to a person who then relied on the promise or representation to
their detriment, resulting in the officer assuming a duty to that person; or (2) the conduct of the
officer “affirmatively caused the harm.” 4 The public duty doctrine does not revoke the common
law principal that governmental entities owe a duty to the public, not individuals.5
The special duty exception
Porchia argued that the first exception to the public duty doctrine, the special duty
exception, applied to his case. The Court explained that there are two ways to establish a special
duty, (1) if a statue or ordinance creates “mandatory acts” for the protection of an individual, or
(2) if an officer “acting within the scope of official conduct, assumes a special duty by creating
specific reliance on the part of certain individuals.” 6 The Court held that the first way did not
apply because Porchia did not point to a law that required the officers to transport him to the
hospital under the circumstances. The Court pointed out that if an EMT has exercised a duty of
care and determined that further intervention was unnecessary, the EMT does not have to
transport the patient to the hospital. Next, the Court held that Porchia further failed to show a
special duty created by a promise from the officers that he relied upon to his detriment. Porchia
did not claim that the officers promised to take him the hospital.
The affirmative harm exception
Porchia also argued that the affirmative harm exception applies to his case because Massa
and Pavelka refused him transport after learning about his socioeconomic status. He alleged that
they took affirmative steps by taking him off the stretcher. The Court stated that in order to
invoke the affirmative harm exception, Porchia must have alleged facts to demonstrate that
Massa and Pavelka created a situation that led directly to Porchia’s harm and that they “actively
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and continuously” brought about the harm. 7 The Court acknowledged that they had only
considered the affirmative harm exception in one other case, 8 which did not have analogous facts
to Porchia’s claim, so they looked to other jurisdictions. Comparing the facts to cases in D.C. and
Utah, the Court held that the facts alleged by Porchia would establish an affirmative action by
Massa and Pavelka, not an omission of action or medical misdiagnosis. Thus, they concluded
that the district court erred in dismissing Porchia’s amended complaint under the public duty
doctrine.
The Good Samaritan statute
Finally, Porchia claims the district court erred in its decision that the Good Samaritan statute
applied because the facts alleged in his complaint demonstrate Massa’s and Pavelka’s failure to
provide medical service based on his socioeconomic status and would establish gross negligence.
The Good Samaritan statute, NRS 41.400(5) does not define gross negligence, but the Court has
defined it as “an act or omission respecting legal duty of an aggravated character as distinguished
from a mere failure to exercise ordinary care.”9 The Court concluded that taking Porchia’s
allegations as true, the actions of the EMTs might rise to the level of gross negligence and could
also amount to an aggravated act. Thus, the Court held that the district court erred in dismissing
Porchia’s amended complaint under the Good Samaritan statute.
Conclusion
The Nevada Supreme Court held that the district court properly concluded that the specific duty
exception to the public duty doctrine did not apply. They also held that to the extent that
Porchia’s claim for negligence was based on misdiagnosis, the affirmative action exception did
not apply. However, the Court held that accepting Porchia’s claims as true, the Massa and
Pavelka’s refusal to transport Porchia due to his socioeconomic status would mean that the
affirmative action exception to the public duty doctrine could apply. Thus, the Court affirmed the
district court’s order to the extent it dismissed Porchia’s claims regarding misdiagnosis, reversed
it for the claims based on socioeconomic status, and remanded for further proceedings on the
surviving claims.
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